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PRICE-RESPONSE ASYMMETRY IN DOMESTIC WHOLESALE 
AND RETAIL DIESEL 2 MARKETS IN PERU
ARTURO VÁSQUEZ♦
Supervisory Agency of Energy Investment – OSINERG
Abstract
This paper tests and conﬁ  rms the hypothesis that retail and wholesale 
Diesel 2 prices respond more quickly to increases than to decreases 
in wholesale and crude oil prices, respectively. Among the possible 
sources of this asymmetry, we ﬁ  nd: production / inventory adjustment 
lags, reﬁ  ning adjustments, market power of some sellers, searching 
costs, among others. By analyzing price transmission at different 
points of the distribution chain, this paper attempts to shed light on 
these theories for the Peruvian oil industry. Wholesale prices for 
Diesel 2 show asymmetry in responding to crude oil price changes, 
which may reﬂ  ect  inventory adjustment effects. Asymmetry also 
appears in the response that retail prices give to wholesale price 
changes, presumably indicating short-run local market power among 
retailers or the existence of searching costs.
I.- Introduction
The price asymmetry response to input price shocks is a stylized fact in several 
industries. I n   his  analysis of an extensive group of American industries  (242 
products), Peltzman (2000) found evidence that the reply to positive shocks (increase 
in input prices) is twice as much as the response to negative shocks (decrease in input 
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prices). These results are signiﬁ  cant, persistent (over ﬁ  ve months), and general (77 
products basically required by ﬁ  nal consumers and 165 products mainly required 
by companies).
With this general evidence, several empirical researchers, who studied the 
hydrocarbon industry, demonstrated that domestic fuel prices respond more quickly 
to increments of international fuel prices than to reductions, which means that there 
is an asymmetrical relationship between domestic fuel prices and international oil 
prices.
Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) evaluated the existence of asymmetric 
responses in gasoline prices for several production and distribution stages of the 
American hydrocarbon industry such as crude oil production, reﬁ  ning and wholesale 
distribution, retail distribution and fuel stations. By using weekly information for 
the 1986–1992 period, as well as error correction models (ECM) estimations, their 
research found evidence of price-response asymmetry both at wholesale level, after 
shocks in the crude oil market, and at retail level, after shocks in the wholesale market. 
In addition, their study found that the asymmetry in the response of wholesale prices 
to oil price shocks is consistent with adjustment costs, while the asymmetry in the 
response of retail prices to wholesale price shocks is consistent with the existence of 
market power in the short-term. Finally, as is expected in the hydrocarbon industry 
case, this research demonstrated that oil price volatility usually starts, principally, 
in the crude oil market1.
Balke, Brown, and Yücel (1998) give a broader approach than Borenstein et al. 
(1997) by using various model speciﬁ  cations with asymmetric response and diverse 
weekly data sub-samples for the 1987–1996 period. Results of the research conﬁ  rm 
some of the ﬁ  ndings of Borenstein et al. (1997), for instance, that most part of 
the ﬁ  nal price volatility has its origin in the upstream segment (that is, due to the 
evolution of international oil market). The authors state that the asymmetry effect 
is sensitive to the model speciﬁ  cations, but not to the selection of sub-samples. 
However, the authors point out that evidence of the asymmetry is strong along the 
whole production and distribution components of the gasoline market.
II.- Factors that would explain the asymmetric effect
Economic  literature suggests different elements  as possible causes for 
asymmetries in the reply of ﬁ  nal prices to variations in input prices, such as the 
existence of focal prices in industries where there is local market power, searching 
costs, lags in the production process, management of fuel inventories, and reﬁ  nery‘s 
adjustment costs.
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-  Lags in the production process and fuel stock management
The existence of ﬁ  nite stocks in the oil industry is a factor for the price-response 
asymmetries to shocks in fuel markets. When long-term crude oil prices increase (for 
example, due to reduced reserves, a restricted supply or an unanticipated increase 
of the demand), reﬁ  neries that keep stocks can raise their prices by adjusting the 
stock value. This situation has negative effects on the demand and positive effects 
on their stock value. When long-term crude oil prices decrease, companies that have 
stock do not decrease their prices so fast because stocks are ﬁ  nite –if they were not 
ﬁ  nite, sales could be quickly increased with a lower price- (Borenstein, Cameron, 
and Gilbert; 1997).
In other words, costs of reducing stocks in the short-term are different from 
costs of increasing stocks. This argument is related to the fact that a reduction in 
stocks can be particularly costly if the reﬁ  nery does not keep enough stocks (see the 
following explanations). This kind of argument is valid at reﬁ  nery level, but not at 
service station level, because they typically have a higher stock rotation.
-  Reﬁ  nery‘s Adjustment Costs
Reﬁ  neries can also face up higher adjustment costs of production, as a result 
of changes in crude oil availability, due to several factors such as the automation 
of distillation operations and processing, as well as ﬁ  xed costs that the operator 
has to assume if the production process stops when oil becomes scarce as it takes 
place in real time. This situation makes operators adjust their production slowly 
through the management of the reﬁ  ning industrial process. When crude oil supply 
becomes costly (as a consequence of an increase in international prices), reﬁ  neries 
are forced to reduce their fuel production quotas, which leads to a sudden increase 
in ex-reﬁ  nery prices. Nevertheless, when crude oil supply is normalized, reﬁ  neries 
adjust the increase of their production quotas slowly in order to recover commercial 
losses caused by shocks in prices. In this way, a higher reﬁ  ning margin is obtained, 
which results in a slow lowering of fuel prices.
-  Market Power and Focal Price
This argument usually explains why asymmetries exist in price transmission. 
It is based on a study developed by Green (1983) and Green and Porter (1984), 
amended by Tirole (2000), and then adapted for the fuel market by Borenstein, 
Cameron, and Gilbert (1997). According to this statement, there is a small group 
of dominant companies, whose reputation is quite important to keep a collusive 
agreement among them and that interact under a scheme of tacit collusion to keep 
high proﬁ  t margins. If companies consider the tacit agreement and have an imperfect 
knowledge of the input price paid by the competitors, then each company will have 70  Revista de la Competencia y la Propiedad Intelectual
a loss function with less probability to decrease its margins rather than to increase 
them. When the input price increases, reﬁ  neries will quickly increase their prices 
to sustain their margins. This fact also constitutes a signal of competition. When 
the input price decreases, companies will reduce their prices only if they are forced 
to do so by a decrease in the demand or by evidence that their competitors are 
lowering their prices as well. Otherwise, the prevailing price is a focal point for the 
oligopolistic coordination (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert 1997).
However, recent researchers demonstrate that there is little evidence supporting 
a relationship between the market structure and the asymmetric response between 
prices. For instance, Peltzman (2000) has found evidence of price asymmetry in 
diverse industries of the USA, independently of their kind of industrial organization 
and the number of companies that they have.
-  Searching Costs and Market Power in the commercialization phase
The existence of searching costs incurred  by consumers to ﬁ  nd s t ations 
with lower prices can give a monopolistic power to companies in their scope of 
local inﬂ  uence. This provokes an asymmetric response in the adjustment of retail 
margins to changes in wholesale prices (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert; 1997 
and Borenstein; 1991).
In the oil industry each service station has monopolistic power in its area of 
inﬂ  uence due to its spatial segmentation at geographical level within a city, and 
by the product differentiation through the provision of complementary services2. 
Naturally, the gas station market power is limited by the likelihood of consumers to 
change the station where they buy fuel. In this way, when wholesalers increase their 
prices, service stations quickly increase their prices to cover their operating costs 
and obtain higher commercial margin; whereas when wholesale prices fall, service 
stations take advantage of their local market power in order to obtain higher proﬁ  ts 
by not reducing their prices automatically. Only when searching costs incurred by 
consumers are relatively lower than the beneﬁ  ts from lower prices, service stations 
are forced to decrease their prices gradually to competitive levels. 
Taking the aforementioned factors into consideration, it is necessary to analyze 
brieﬂ  y the features of the downstream segment in the Peruvian oil industry. In this 
way, we can evaluate whether the industrial organization and market conditions can 
determine the existence of asymmetries in fuel prices transmission.
III.- Price-response asymmetry in the Peruvian oil industry
In the oil industry, the segment called downstream begins with reﬁ  ning and 
ﬁ  nishes with the wholesale and retail commercialization of fuels to the industrial, 
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3.1.- Reﬁ  ning and wholesale organization
In the reﬁ  ning activity, crude oil is converted into products with a high market 
value such as gasoline, LPG, Diesel 22, and other fuels3. Reﬁ  ning is an activity that 
involves large sunk costs and signiﬁ  cant scope and scale economies, which can 
typically prevent investment in new reﬁ  ning assets depending on the magnitude of 
the demand4.
In Peru, two reﬁ  neries perform this activity: La Pampilla Reﬁ  nery, operated by 
RELAPASA consortium and led by Repsol-YPF; and Talara Reﬁ  nery, operated by 
PETROPERU, a public company that also operates reﬁ  neries in Iquitos (Loreto), 
El Milagro (Amazonas), and Conchán (Lima). The ﬁ  rst two reﬁ  neries processed 
almost 85% of the reﬁ  ned fuel in Peru during 2003. Although of a smaller size, 
Maple Corp. is the company that operates the Pucallpa Reﬁ  nery under a concession 
scheme and basically supplies the local demand of the rainforest region. Part of the 
oil products, particularly residual fuels and some types of gasoline, are exported 
while the rest of the production is bound for the local market.
In the case of Peru, the production of oil products is highly concentrated with 
a different market share per type of fuel due to different reﬁ  ning patterns used in 
reﬁ  neries. For instance, PETROPERU has a strong participation in LPG production, 
whereas RELAPASA participates in residual production5. The latter mainly imports 
crude oil in order to reﬁ  ne it On the other hand, PETROPERU imports a large 
quantity of Diesel 2 previously processed (6.7 million barrels in 2002, more than 
30% of national supply) to offer it in the local market. Diesel 2 fuel is mainly used in 
electricity generation, public and residential transportation, and industrial processes. 
For this reason, the analysis of the concentration level in the local market must be 
2   For a discussion of these elements in the Peruvian case, review Ruiz (2001).
3   Diesel 2 fuel is a speciﬁ  c fractional distillate of fuel oil (mostly petroleum) that is used in 
a diesel engine invented by German engineer Rudolf Diesel, and perfected by Charles F. 
Kettering. The term typically refers to fuel that has been processed from petroleum, but 
increasingly, alternatives such as biodiesel or biomass to liquid (BTL) or gas to liquid (GTL) 
diesel that are not derived from petroleum are being developed. As a hydrocarbon mixture, it 
is obtained in the fractional distillation of crude oil between 250 °C and 350 °C at atmospheric 
pressure. Diesel 2 is considered to be a fuel oil and is about 18% heavier than gasoline. 
3   Reﬁ  neries can also develop other related products such as lubricants, asphalt, and solvents. 
4   According to Scherer  (1996), i n  t he American market, t he optimal m i nimum scale of 
operation for reﬁ  neries has been calculated at 200,000 barrels of processed crude oil per day. 
The necessary investment for a plant with these features ﬂ  uctuates between US$ 800 million 
and US$ 2,000 million. 
5   This situation has changed because of the operation of the Camisea Project, which includes 
a fractionating plant operated by Pluspetrol Co. See Garcia and Vasquez (2004) for further 
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Source: Monthly Report, Ministry of Energy and Mining of Peru. Own preparation.
performed considering imports made almost exclusively by reﬁ  ning companies, 
which modiﬁ  es their participation with respect to the production indicator.
The Herﬁ  ndhal–Hirschman (IHH) concentration index shows a very high level 
of industrial concentration. Thus, if a level of 2500 is taken as a threshold to consider 
the industry as highly concentrated, the average IHH for fuel sales at reﬁ  nery level 
in Peru largely exceeds this threshold in different products6.
TABLE 1




PETROPERU RELAPASA MAPLE TOTAL IHH
Gasoline
(%)




4 709(57) 3 407(41) 132(2) 8 248(100) 4 968
Diesel
(%)
5 779(43) 7 425(55) 273(2) 13 477(100) 4 878
Residual
(%)
7 109(37) 12 096(63) 51(--) 19 256(100) 5 309
LPG
(%)
1 681(73) 636(27) --(--) 2 317(100) 6 017
Others
(%)
829(63) 223(17) 256(20) 1 308(100) 4 691
Total
(%)
24 889(47) 27 327(52) 1 036(2) 52 909(100) 4 884
6   The  Herﬁ  ndahl–Hirchman  (IHH) m e thodology is largely used i n  t he analysis of merger 
controls. The index is obtained by adding up the market share squared of each of the companies 
that compose the relevant market IHH = ΣSi
2, where Si, is the market share of the i-th company. 
The IHH has a maximum value of 10,000 which indicates that the market is composed of only 
one company with 100% market share. This index satisﬁ  es the three desirable features that 
an industrial concentration indicator should have (Tirole; 2000). In other words, the index is 
symmetric among ﬁ  rms: it increases before any growth in the dispersion that keeps constant 
the average considering identical companies (Lorenz condition), and it decreases when the 
number of companies increases. Price-response asymmetry in domestic wholesale and retail diesel 2 markets in Peru  73
The presence of high concentration level and entry barriers can be consistent with 
the existence of market power that companies exert. Naturally, this exercise would 
generate asymmetries in price transmission due to companies’ commercialization 
policies -related to the management of reﬁ  ning margins- in order to maximize 
proﬁ  ts. Another reason is the operation policies to adjust reﬁ  ning costs when there 
is a sudden fall in crude oil prices, as it was mentioned in Section 2. 
The following industrial activity consists of the supply of reﬁ  ned fuels to ﬁ  nal 
consumers, other wholesale dealers, retail dealers, and service stations that sell 
such products to ﬁ  nal consumers. Wholesale dealers can acquire fuel from national 
producers in reﬁ  ning plants or by direct import. Wholesalers can also export liquid 
fuel or other oil products. 
Some wholesalers either have their own service stations or are afﬁ  liated to 
a trademark, being supplied on an exclusive basis. These companies also supply 
independent service stations and larger fuel consumers (direct consumers). Other 
wholesale companies do not have a trademark and supply independent stations. 
Wholesalers are fuel traders at a high scale; therefore, they buy and sell fuel using 
invoices, remittance guides, or purchase orders. Consequently, fuel trade operations 
are separated from the physical dispatch.
This activity does not involve signiﬁ  cant sunk costs; therefore, we ﬁ  nd a large 
number of operators and a disperse market. In this activity, there is a lower level 
of concentration associated with the number of companies and their market shares. 
On the other hand, as there are no entry barriers to this segment, a higher level of 
competition is expected. That is what happens in the Peruvian market. If we observe 
the IHH values for this segment, we ﬁ  nd that this value is close to 1300 in the case 
of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel, and nearly 2120 in the case of residual oils.
In spite of the increased competition in this segment, several factors, such as 
the stock adjustment costs in supplying plants when there are disruptions in the fuel 
supply, can be sources of price-response asymmetry between wholesale and retail 
prices (as was mentioned by Borenstein et al; 1997).
3.2.- Evidence of asymmetry in price responses: the case of Diesel 2
3.2.1.- Retail and wholesale segments
In order to evaluate the existence and the probable degree of fuel price-response 
asymmetries in Peru, Diesel 2 is taken as a case study not only for its relevance in 
terms of national demand7 but also for the existence of better data sources for this 
fuel. Figure 1 shows the evolution of Diesel 2 nominal prices. A strong relationship 
7   According to DGH-MEM information, Diesel 2 had a market share of nearly 25% of liquid 
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Source: Vásquez (2005).
Following the guidelines proposed by Borenstein et al (1997), and Engle and 
Granger (1987), an error correction model was considered in order to evaluate 
the presence of asymmetries in the response of Diesel 2 prices. This model links 
percentage variations of retail p r ices    (service stations’  average  list price) 
with the lags of percentage changes of wholesale and retail prices ( ,   
respectively), t o   a g r oup of ﬁ  ctitious variables  Mt-i  and  Ct-i t hat represent the 
asymmetry effect. Mt-i is 1 if lagged wholesale price   is higher than   and 
zero otherwise. Ct-I, is 1 if lagged retail price   is higher than   and zero 
otherwise. According to the authors, there will be evidence of asymmetry if θi and 
γi coefﬁ  cients are statistically different from zero.
The proposed model is as follows: 
among parity prices, reﬁ  nery net prices, ex-reﬁ  nery prices, wholesale prices, retail 
prices, and international prices is also shown. The evidence suggests that there is 
a signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence of international oil prices (approximated by WTI) on the 
variation of domestic prices. In other words, the small size of the Peruvian economy 
in comparison with developed countries as well as its opening degree determines 
that the country is a price taker from the international oil market.
FIGURE 1
EVOLUTION OF DIESEL 2 NOMINAL PRICE76  Revista de la Competencia y la Propiedad Intelectual
 In this equation et-1 is the error-correction term, which corrects discrepancies 
between prices in the long-term; α is the adjustment parameter that quantiﬁ  es the 
speed at which discrepancies are corrected (if the value is 0, there is no relationship 
between variables; if the value is –1, the adjustment is perfect and there are no 
delays in the correction of price deviations after shocks). The error-correction term 
is calculated through Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method8. Through 
the estimates of this model, it is possible to evaluate whether there are asymmetric 
effects on price transmission in the Diesel 2 case. The results of the statistical test 
are shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
ASSYMMETRY TEST IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL PRICES 
TRANSMISSION
 (1)
8   The number of lags used to estimate the model is 6, which was obtained by comparing Akaike 
and Schwartz criteria. The analysis period covers from January 1996 to February 2003. et-1 is 




Total Consumer price Wholesale Price
F - Statistic 8,820 8,430 6,021
p - value 0,000 0,000 0,000
 
The  ﬁ  rst test is “Total”,  which e v aluates the signiﬁ  cance of the group of 
parameters θi and γi. These parameters quantify the asymmetric effect of prices 
on both wholesale and retail components, respectively. As it can be observed in 
Table 3, the F – statistic rejects the null hypothesis of non-existence of asymmetric 
effects. For that reason, there is strong evidence that asymmetric price responses are 
important in the Peruvian Diesel 2 market.
Additional tests were made in order to evaluate which the principal source 
of asymmetry is. The “Consumer Price” test evaluates the statistical signiﬁ  cance 
of γi parameters that quantify the asymmetric effect on retail prices; whereas the 
“Wholesale Price” test evaluates the statistical signiﬁ  cance of θi parameters that 
quantify the asymmetric effect on wholesale prices.
A B F Q G X − − − − −
= = = =
−
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ + + +
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 1
1 1 1 1
1  - 0.887*  + 1.129
n n n n
C M C
t o t i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i
C M
t t t
p c e p p M C
where e p pPrice-response asymmetry in domestic wholesale and retail diesel 2 markets in Peru  77
The results of these tests indicate that the sources of asymmetry in Peru 
would be from both segments of the oil industry. In other words, factors related to 
wholesale and retail distribution at the bottom of the commercialization chain of 
Diesel 2 account for differences in the response of the ﬁ  nal price when there are 
price increases or reductions in higher segments of the fuel production chain.
It is possible to obtain complementary evidence of this fact from the analysis 
of the impulse response functions, which can be estimated from the model shown 
above. This analysis makes it possible to simulate the effect of a shock on Diesel 2 
wholesale prices on retail prices.
In Figure 2, it can be observed that the Diesel 2 retail price has a strong upward 
reaction when there is a 1% percent increment in wholesale prices, and then it 
continues growing gradually. In the ﬁ  rst month, the transmission achieves 50% of 
the effect of the original shock. Then, in the following months, the wholesale price 
continues rising until completing the shock transmission (approximately 5 months). 
In contrast, after a negative shock in wholesale prices, retail prices decrease slowly 
along several months and do not transmit the shock totally (approximately 50% after 
3 months in accumulated terms). This evidence supports the idea of the existence 
of asymmetries in the response of Diesel 2 retail prices to shocks in the wholesale 
market.
FIGURE 2
ACCUMULATED EFFECT OF A SHOCK IN DIESEL 2 WHOLESALE 
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 3.2.2.- International oil market – Domestic wholesale market
Taking the guidelines proposed in the previous section to evaluate the presence 
of asymmetries in the response of Diesel 2 prices in wholesale and retail segments, 
we made  a s e cond e r ror correction model e s timation,  which r e lates  wholesale 
price variations in percentage terms    with  lags of percentage changes of 
wholesale price to international crude oil price, represented by WTI ( , 
, respectively), and a group of ﬁ  ctitious variables Mt-i and WTIt-I that represent the 
asymmetry effect. Mt-i is 1 if lagged wholesale price   is higher than   , and 
zero otherwise. WTIt-i is 1 if the price of lagged WTI   is higher than   and 
zero otherwise. As in the previous case, there will be an asymmetric effect if θi and 
γi coefﬁ  cients are statistically different from zero. 
The proposed model is as follows:
  
Based on the estimates of this model, it is possible to evaluate if there are 
asymmetrical effects on transmission of crude oil shock prices toward the wholesale 
distribution chain in the Diesel 2 market9. The results of hypothesis tests are shown 
in Table 4.
TABLE 4
TEST OF ASYMMETRY IN WTI AND WHOLESALE PRICE 
TRANSMISSION
(2)
9   The number of lags used to estimate the model was 3, which was obtained by comparing 
Akaike and Schwartz data criteria. The analysis period covers from January 1996 to February 




Total Consumer price Wholesale Price
F - Statistic 9,140 4,481 8,282
p - value 0,000 0,006 0,004
 
As it happened in the previous case, the ﬁ  rst test is “Total”, which evaluates 
the signiﬁ  cance of the group of parameters θi and γi. These parameters quantify 
A B F Q G X − − − − −
= = = =
−
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆ + + +
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 1
1 1 1 1
1   -  0.901884*  -  1.505997
n n n n
M M WTI
t o t i t i i t i i t i i t i t
i i i i
M WTI
t t t
p c e p p M WTI
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the asymmetric effect of price shocks in the international crude oil market on the 
domestic wholesale market. As it can be observed in Table 4, the F-statistic rejects 
the hypothesis of non-existence of asymmetric effects. Two additional tests were 
made in order to evaluate which the principal source of asymmetry is. The “WTI 
prices” evaluates the signiﬁ  cance of γi parameters that quantify the asymmetric 
effect produced by international crude oil price ﬂ  uctuations, whereas “Wholesale 
Price” test evaluates the statistical signiﬁ  cance of θi parameters that quantify the 
asymmetric effect on wholesale prices. 
If we calculate the impulse response functions from Model (2), it will be possible 
to simulate the effect of international oil price shocks over Diesel 2 wholesale prices. 
We could observe that the Diesel 2 wholesale price has a strong upward reaction 
when there is a percentage increment in the international price, and then it continues 
growing gradually. During the ﬁ  rst month, the price rises by nearly 50% of the 
FIGURE 3
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initial shock. Then, in the following months, it continues rising until completing 
the shock transmission (approximately 4 months). In contrast, after a negative oil 
price shock, the wholesale price decreases slowly along several months and does 
not transmit totally (approximately 70% after 5 months). This result also supports 
the evidence of the existence of asymmetries in the response of Diesel 2 prices in 
the wholesale segment of the fuel market (see Figure 3). The results of these tests 
corroborate the evidence shown in the previous section, and they allow us to state 
that the existence of asymmetries in price responses is an important stylized fact of 
the Peruvian oil industry.
IV.- Conclusions
The presence of asymmetries in price responses would be a stylized fact of 
structural nature in the Peruvian fuel market according to the evidence shown in this 
document for the Diesel 2 case. The international literature on oil industry suggests 
that factors such as the stock adjustment cost and the existence of production lags 
are relevant in the case of wholesale price-response asymmetry to changes in crude 
oil price. However, in the retail market, the literature suggests the existence of short-
term market power. The latter fact is the result of the spatial competition among 
service stations.
In other cases, the literature (Peltzman, 2000) shows the presence of price-
response  asymmetries in a  wide variety of industries  (manufacturing, t e xtile, 
agriculture, alcoholic drinks, recreation, electrical appliances, among others) with 
different types of industrial conﬁ  guration (from oligopoly to competitive structures). 
This is to say that the price-response asymmetries are common issues in economies 
all over the world and usually have better explanations than just market power.
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